NCRC Comment in Opposition to Coinbase National Trust Charter Application

November 3, 2025

Johnathan V. Gould
Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219

Sebastian R. Astrada
Director for Licensing, Midsize, Trust, Credit Card, and Novel Banks
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219

RE: Public Comment Letter in Opposition to Coinbase National Trust Company Charter Application (2025-Charter-343449)

Dear Director Estrada,

The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) strongly opposes the application by Coinbase Global, Inc. (“Coinbase”) for a national trust bank charter under the name Coinbase National Trust Company (“CNTC”).

NCRC is a coalition of more than 700 community-based organizations that have been fighting for economic justice for almost 30 years. Our mission is to create opportunities for people and communities to build and maintain wealth. NCRC members include community reinvestment organizations, community development corporations, local and state government agencies, faith-based institutions, fair housing and civil rights groups, minority and women-owned business associations, and housing counselors from across the nation. NCRC also partners with many of the nation’s largest national and regional banks to develop Community Benefits Agreements that channel billions of dollars into underserved communities. These partnerships are designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and long-term impact. NCRC’s Innovation Council brings together leaders from financial technology companies to explore innovative, inclusive financial solutions. Each of these networks and partnerships serve as collaborative spaces where stakeholders can share insights, develop strategies, and promote equitable access to financial services.

The OCC must reject Coinbase’s application for a national trust bank charter due to serious concerns regarding Coinbase’s disregard for enforcement, governance, compliance, and consumer protection laws. Granting Coinbase a national trust bank charter would establish a fiduciary relationship between the company and consumers nationwide, allowing Coinbase to offer custodial services and manage settlements. Therefore, it is imperative that the OCC reject Coinbase’s application.

  1. The OCC has ample authority to deny any charter application.

The OCC charters national banks under the authority of the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended.[1] Federal regulations detail the factors and principles that the OCC considers when reviewing charter applications, with the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual providing additional guidance on the chartering process.[2]

In reviewing charter applications for national banks, including national trust banks, the OCC must consider the following factors and principles[3]:

  • Maintaining a safe and sound banking system;[4]
  • Encouraging a national bank to provide fair access to financial services by helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community;[5]
  • Ensuring compliance with laws and regulations;[6] and
  • Promoting fair treatment of customers, including efficiency and better service.[7]

In addition, federal regulations detail the policy considerations that the OCC accounts for when evaluating an application to establish a national bank. The OCC considers whether the proposed institution:

  • Has organizers who are familiar with national banking laws and regulations or Federal savings association laws and regulations, respectively;[8]
  • Has competent management, including a board of directors, with ability and experience relevant to the types of services to be provided;[9]
  • Has capital that is sufficient to support the projected volume and type of business;[10]
  • Can reasonably be expected to achieve and maintain profitability;[11]
  • Will be operated in a safe and sound manner;[12] and
  • Does not have a title that misrepresents the nature of the institution or the services it offers.[13]

The OCC’s recent consideration of limited-purpose national trust charters for stablecoin issuers and other fintech firms exceeds the agency’s authority under the National Bank Act. Coinbase is not a trust company but is seeking to engage in core banking activities, including facilitating payments and taking deposits, without obtaining deposit insurance or becoming subject to consolidated Federal Reserve supervision: “granting these firms limited-purpose trust charters would blur the statutory boundaries of what constitutes a “bank,” undermine the credibility of the national charter, and heighten systemic risk by allowing them to operate under a lighter regulatory regime.”[14]

In evaluating Coinbase’s trust charter application, the OCC must consider the full range of statutory and prudential factors set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 5.13(b) and section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act[15]; the OCC may deny the application if significant supervisory, CRA (if applicable), or compliance concerns exist. These factors include whether the applicant presents significant supervisory, compliance, or Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) [16] concerns, and whether its proposed activities are consistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the National Bank Act, and the Home Owners’ Loan Act. The OCC is also guided by its mandate to maintain a safe and sound banking system, approving only those institutions with a reasonable chance of success that will provide fair access to financial services[17], meet the credit needs of their communities—including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods—and comply with all applicable laws and regulations. Coinbase’s proposal, centered on stablecoin reserve management and custodial services rather than traditional fiduciary or community banking functions, raises serious questions under these standards and warrants full public scrutiny before any chartering decision.

  1. Coinbase’s history of enforcement actions and litigation creates significant supervisory and compliance concerns, and shows a disregard for regulatory compliance, consumer protection, governance, and risk management.

A history of public enforcement actions, litigation matters, and cybersecurity breaches raises fundamental questions about the character and fitness of Coinbase’s leadership. This pattern of conduct raises serious doubts about the company’s ability, or willingness, to invest in the creation of adequate internal controls and risk management systems that are necessary for the operation of a national trust bank. Below are details of some recent federal and state actions against Coinbase or its affiliates, which demonstrate a reckless disregard for regulatory compliance and consumer protection.

2.1.Federal Enforcement Actions

Coinbase has been the subject of significant federal enforcement proceedings that demonstrate weaknesses in its compliance and governance systems.

  • Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC): In March 2021, Coinbase entered into a settlement with the CFTC, paying a $6.5 million penalty and agreeing to cease-and-desist after regulators found reckless false, misleading, or inaccurate reporting on trading volumes and a former employee’s wash trading activities on its platform. The CFTC’s order made clear that Coinbase failed to implement sufficient internal controls and oversight mechanisms to ensure accurate trade reporting.[18]

This federal enforcement action highlights deficiencies in Coinbase’s internal risk management and reporting systems. Such shortcomings are highly relevant to the OCC’s evaluation of whether the company can be entrusted with the fiduciary responsibilities and regulatory obligations inherent in a national trust charter.

2.2. State Enforcement Environment

Coinbase has also faced significant scrutiny at the state level, where regulators and attorneys general have repeatedly sanctioned or sued the company for violations of securities and consumer-protection laws.

  • New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS): In January 2023, Coinbase agreed to a $50 million penalty and to invest an additional $50 million in compliance improvements following a Consent Order that found serious failures in its Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering programs. NYDFS required Coinbase to engage an independent monitor to oversee remediation, underscoring the severity of the deficiencies.[19]
  • Oregon Attorney General: In April 2025, the Oregon Attorney General sued Coinbase under state securities laws, alleging the sale of unregistered securities to residents. Coinbase has responded by suing Oregon officials, an unusual and adversarial approach to oversight that raises questions about the company’s posture toward regulatory compliance.[20]
  • State Securities Regulators: Multiple states, including California, have challenged Coinbase’s staking program as an unregistered securities offering, reinforcing concerns about the company’s willingness to operate programs without clear regulatory approval.[21]

These repeated compliance deficiencies and enforcement actions demonstrate the ongoing supervisory challenges that accompany digital-asset trust institutions. Granting national trust status to entities with such complex and unsettled risk profiles, absent any opportunity for public comment, undermines confidence in the OCC’s chartering process and the safety and soundness of the resulting institutions.

2.3. Consumer Harm and Crypto Kiosk Fraud

An additional area of concern is Coinbase’s connection to the broader cryptocurrency infrastructure that enables widespread crypto kiosk fraud—a rapidly growing consumer-protection crisis that disproportionately affects seniors and vulnerable individuals.

While Coinbase does not directly operate cryptocurrency kiosks, the company functions as critical infrastructure for the kiosk ecosystem. Many kiosk operators depend on major exchanges like Coinbase for liquidity, asset sourcing, and transaction settlement, positioning Coinbase as an enabling intermediary in the supply chain that facilitates kiosk-related fraud. This interconnection places heightened importance on the company’s anti-money laundering (AML) and transaction-monitoring systems. Yet state and federal regulators—including the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—have repeatedly found Coinbase’s compliance controls to be insufficient for identifying and preventing suspicious activity. Those same deficiencies increase the likelihood that Coinbase’s systems may fail to detect the transactional patterns common to kiosk-related fraud.

Recent federal and state data underscore the scale of this threat. The Federal Trade Commission reported that consumers lost over $65 million to Bitcoin ATM scams in the first half of 2024, with a median individual loss of $10,000, and that older adults were several times more likely to be targeted.[22] FinCEN and multiple state attorneys general have documented that kiosks have been used to launder “millions” in criminal proceeds, prompting a wave of new state laws imposing transaction caps, disclosure mandates, refund rights, and operator registration requirements.

If granted a national trust charter, Coinbase could potentially use federal preemption to sidestep these emerging state-level consumer protections.  Given Coinbase’s market dominance and its role as a liquidity provider to kiosk operators, any such preemption could erode state consumer safeguards precisely as new protections are being enacted to curb fraud and abuse.

For these reasons, the OCC should require the public release of Coinbase’s business plan to clarify its relationships with kiosk operators, its internal monitoring protocols for high-risk retail channels, and its approach to mitigating consumer fraud risks. Transparency in these areas is essential for public confidence and for assessing whether Coinbase’s risk management framework meets the heightened fiduciary standards applicable to a national trust institution.

  1. Granting a national trust bank charter to Coinbase would enable regulatory arbitrage that harms communities and consumers.

Granting a national trust bank charter to Coinbase would enable regulatory arbitrage that harms communities and consumers. A national trust charter would provide Coinbase with the reputational benefits, enhanced market credibility, and federal regulatory status of a banking institution while allowing it to avoid many of the fundamental obligations that justify such privileges. This arrangement would create dangerous imbalances in four areas: community investment responsibilities, consumer protection standards, regulatory oversight and accountability, and systemic risk management. Traditional banks must earn their federal charters by meeting robust standards for community reinvestment, consumer protection, and safety and soundness. Approving Coinbase’s application would create a two-tier system where digital asset firms receive comparable federal status without comparable public obligations, undermining the integrity of the entire chartering framework.

3.1  Lost Reinvestment to Communities

National trust banks are not subject to Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements, meaning Coinbase would gain the prestige and benefits of a federal charter without any obligation to serve low- and moderate-income communities or meet local credit needs. Traditional banks must demonstrate how they reinvest deposits back into their communities—Coinbase would face no such requirement. Coinbase’s involvement in USDC stablecoin issuance means a trust charter would legitimize diverting billions of dollars from community bank deposits into Treasury bills and money market funds that bypass local reinvestment obligations. This diversion of capital away from community reinvestment represents a fundamental departure from the principle that federally chartered institutions should serve public purposes, not merely private profit.

Applying community development obligations to stablecoin issuers would drive billions of dollars into needed community and economic development projects and initiatives. In 2023 alone, banks originated over $127 billion in loans that meet the CRA’s definition of community development for LMI communities and households. Imposing community development requirements on national trust banks would eliminate the competitive advantage they currently enjoy over traditional banks, particularly community banks.

3.2  Weakened Consumer Protection Standards

The “national trust bank” designation would provide Coinbase with enhanced credibility and consumer confidence, potentially attracting more deposits and assets under management. However, Coinbase would not face the same consumer protection requirements or supervisory scrutiny as traditional depository institutions. A federal trust charter would preempt state-level money transmitter licenses and consumer protection laws that currently apply to Coinbase’s operations in many jurisdictions. This federal preemption could weaken consumer protections that states have enacted specifically for digital asset activities. Trust banks aren’t FDIC-insured, but the “national bank” label could mislead consumers into expecting federal protection, creating moral hazard and exposing them to avoidable harm.

3.3  Reduced Regulatory Oversight and Accountability

National trust banks face lighter oversight than commercial banks. They avoid Federal Reserve consolidated supervision, FDIC insurance requirements, and Community Reinvestment Act obligations. The OCC supervises only fiduciary activities, leaving Coinbase’s exchange operations and stablecoin business largely outside federal banking oversight.

Coinbase’s documented compliance deficiencies and federal enforcement actions raise serious concerns about whether limited trust charter supervision would be adequate. The company’s violations demonstrate ongoing struggles with internal controls under current requirements. Granting a trust charter would reduce oversight precisely when Coinbase’s risk profile demands enhanced scrutiny, potentially allowing problematic practices in its exchange operations and stablecoin activities to continue unchecked.

3.4  Competitive Distortion and Systemic Risk

Traditional banks that maintain community reinvestment programs, robust compliance infrastructure, and comprehensive consumer protections would face a competitive disadvantage against Coinbase operating under a lighter trust charter while enjoying comparable market credibility. This regulatory arbitrage allows Coinbase to gain federal banking status while avoiding the obligations and safeguards that justify such privileges. The OCC should not permit Coinbase to use a trust charter as a regulatory shortcut to avoid state-level oversight while lacking the responsibilities and protections of insured banking institutions. The resulting competitive distortion could trigger a race to the bottom, incentivizing other institutions to seek similar arrangements. Moreover, granting federal banking status to an entity with Coinbase’s unsettled risk profile—particularly one involved in stablecoin issuance that could scale to trillions of dollars—introduces systemic risk without corresponding safeguards, deposit insurance, or resolution mechanisms that protect the financial system when traditional banks fail.

  1. Stablecoin issuers should not be permitted to use a federal trust bank charter to avoid state-level consumer protections.

A national trust bank is not a full-service bank and does not operate under the same regulatory framework as federally insured depository institutions. Granting Coinbase a national trust bank charter would allow it to access certain federal privileges—such as preemption of state consumer protection laws—without being subject to the comprehensive oversight and consumer safeguards that apply to traditional banks. The OCC should not permit a stablecoin issuer to use a trust charter as a regulatory shortcut to avoid state-level oversight while lacking the responsibilities and protections associated with insured banking institutions.

4.1. Risks to Safety and Soundness and Government Bailout

Despite the passage of the GENIUS Act, federal regulators have yet to implement regulations implementing the GENIUS Act, which will be critical to establish clear rules for stablecoins, leaving critical issues of backing, redemption, and oversight in regulatory limbo. While the GENIUS Act proposes basic reserve and disclosure standards for stablecoin issuers, which does not go into effect until January 2027 at the earliest. Even then, legal scholar Art Wilmarth warns that “By placing the federal government’s seal of approval on uninsured and weakly-regulated nonbank stablecoins, the GENIUS Act would greatly increase the likelihood that future runs on stablecoins would trigger systemic financial crises and require costly government bailouts.”[23]

Granting Coinbase a trust bank charter before a comprehensive regulatory framework is in place would expose both consumers and the broader financial system to poorly understood risks. Coinbase’s proposed banking operations would create an unprecedented moral hazard by extending the federal safety net to a company whose core business involves highly volatile digital assets. Stablecoin issuers like Coinbase operate business models that make them uniquely susceptible to runs in the absence of appropriate risk management standards.[24] While these companies typically invest reserves in traditional financial instruments like short-term Treasuries or deposits with regional banks, these connections create dangerous vectors for contagion rather than sources of stability.

4.2. Separation of Banking and Commerce

In the United States, bright lines have existed to separate banking from commerce. The separation of banking and commerce is critical to maintaining the safety and soundness of our financial system. The national trust bank charter is a problematic contradiction to that principle. If Coinbase receives a charter, regulators will have little insight into its corporate parent’s operations even though they have many interdependent relationships.

  1. The OCC must place a moratorium on all stablecoin company charter applications until laws and regulations can effectively address safety and soundness concerns and protect consumers against fraud.

The current regulatory framework governing cryptocurrency and stablecoin is not sufficient to avoid massive fraud and financial losses, nor does it adequately address stablecoin liquidity standards, reserve requirements, or consumer protection.

The digital asset ecosystem that Coinbase operates in has been plagued by fraud, hacking, and cybercrime, with billions of dollars in losses annually. US consumers are already losing billions of dollars a year to fraud, with stablecoins overtaking Bitcoin as the illicit currency of choice for criminals. According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 2024 Internet Crime Report, US consumer losses due to scams are increasing at a startling rate, rising from just under $4 billion in 2020, to over $16 billion in 2024.[25] Cryptocurrency has become the top way that complainants reported financial loss in fraud, accounting for $9.3 billion dollars in losses in 2024 alone.[26] As a group, those over the age of 60 suffered the most losses and submitted the most complaints referencing cryptocurrency.[27] While Bitcoin was the currency of choice for cybercriminals for years, this changed in 2022: a 2025 report shows a seismic shift to stablecoins that now account for 63% of all illicit crypto transactions.[28]

In June of this year, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a leading global financial crime watchdog, recently called on countries to take stronger action to combat illicit finance in crypto assets, warning that gaps in regulation could have global repercussions.[29]

Furthermore, the OCC should also deny all stablecoin company charter applications until the Secretary of the Treasury has finalized rules to implement Section 5(A) of the GENIUS Act. That section of the Act provides that a permitted payment stablecoin issuer shall be treated as a financial institution for purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act, and as such, shall be subject to all federal laws applicable to a financial institution located in the United States relating to economic sanctions, prevention of money laundering, customer identification, and due diligence.

Before the OCC considers granting a charter to any stablecoin issuer, the following rules and regulations implementing provisions of the GENIUS Act must be in place:

  • The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to issue regulations related to reserve requirements and liquidity standards for federally regulated stablecoin issuers.[30]
  • The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may issue rules to ensure that insured depository institutions issuing stablecoins comply with capital and risk management standards.[31]
  • The Department of the Treasury is authorized to issue rules on consumer protection, including public disclosures of reserve composition, redemption procedures and prohibited marketing practices.[32]
  • The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is authorized to issue implementing regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act to ensure anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance by stablecoin issuers.[33]
  • The Secretary of the Treasury is granted broad authority to issue rules and guidance necessary to carry out the act.[34]
  1. The comment period for charter applications must be extended to at least 90 days.

A key feature of the American democratic process is the opportunity for public engagement in the lawmaking process and in the American banking law this means the public’s right to participate by submitting comments on charter applications. A 30-day comment period for national trust applications is simply not sufficient for meaningful public engagement.

We urge the OCC to publicize the nonpublic portions of all stablecoin issuer charter applications (redacting any nonpublic personal information about the proposed entities’ officers or directors).

Finally, we request that the OCC extend the comment periods for all such applications to 90 days.

Conclusion

The OCC must reject Coinbase’s application for a national trust bank charter. Its history of enforcement actions and litigation shows a disregard for regulatory compliance, consumer protection, governance, and risk management.

Granting a national trust bank charter to Coinbase would enable regulatory arbitrage, reduce community development, risk significant harm to consumers and communities, and would create systemic risk.

Finally, until the GENIUS Act has proven effective in practice and its implementing regulations provide adequate safeguards, granting a national trust bank charter to a stablecoin issuer would create systemic risk and fuel the illicit finance and fraud already harming U.S. consumers.

Thank you for considering this request. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact Jesse Van Tol, NCRC’s Chief Executive Officer, at 202-464-2709 or jvantol@ncrc.org.

Sincerely,

Jesse Van Tol
President & Chief Executive Officer
NCRC


 

[1] 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq.

[2] Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters. December 2021. https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/charters.pdf

[3] 12 C.F.R. s. 5.20(e).

[4] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(1)(i)

[5] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(1)(ii)

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(A)

[9] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(B)

[10] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(C)

[11] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(D)

[12] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(E)

[13] 12 CFR 5.20(f)(2)(i)(F)

[14] Bank Policy Institute. (2023, November 2). BPI urges OCC to preserve the integrity of national trust charters. BPI. https://bpi.com/bpi-urges-occ-to-preserve-the-integrity-of-national-trust-charters/

[15] 12 U.S.C. 1816

[16] Ibid., 4.

[17] Ibid.

[18] U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “CFTC Orders Coinbase Inc. to Pay $6.5 Million for False, Misleading, or Inaccurate Reporting and Wash Trading,” Release No. 8369-21, March 19, 2021, Washington, D.C., https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8369-21

[19] New York State Department of Financial Services, “Superintendent Adrienne A. Harris Announces $100 Million Settlement with Coinbase, Inc. after DFS Investigation Finds Significant Failings in the Company’s Compliance Program,” press release, January 4 2023, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr202301041

[20] Oregon Department of Justice, “Oregon Attorney General Rayfield Sues Coinbase for Promoting and Selling High-Risk Investments,” April 18, 2025, https://www.doj.state.or.us/media-home/news-media-releases/oregon-attorney-general-rayfield-sues-coinbase-for-promoting-and-selling-high-risk-investments/

[21] California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, “DFPI Issues Action Against Coinbase Citing Staking Rewards Program Violates Securities Law,” press release, June 6, 2023, https://www.dfpi.ca.gov/press_release/dfpi-issues-action-against-coinbase-citing-staking-rewards-program-violates-securities-law/

[22] Federal Trade Commission, “New FTC Data Shows Massive Increase in Losses to Bitcoin ATM Scams,” press release, September 3, 2024, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/09/new-ftc-data-shows-massive-increase-losses-bitcoin-atm-scams

[23] Open Banker, “Congress Must Reject the GENIUS Act and Remove the Dangers Posed by Nonbank Stablecoins” by Art Wilmarth: https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/AFR-Factsheet.GENIUS-Acts-Flaws-and-Failures.pdf

[24] Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2024 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury,

2024), 8, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2024AnnualReport.pdf.

[25] Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2024 Internet Crime Report (Washington, DC: Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025), 7, https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf.

[26] Ibid., 3.

[27] Ibid., 35.

[28] Chainalysis, “2025 Crypto Crime Report: Illicit Volumes Portend Record Year as On-Chain Crime Becomes Increasingly Diverse and Professionalized,” January 15, 2025, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-report-introduction/

[29] Reuters, “Global financial crime watchdog calls for action on crypto risks,” June 25, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/global-financial-crime-watchdog-calls-action-crypto-risks-2025-06-26/

[30] GENIUS Act, Sec. 4(e)(2), S.1582, 119th Cong.

[31] GENIUS Act, Sec. 4(e)(3), S.1582, 119th Cong.

[32] GENIUS Act, Sec. 6(a)–(c), S.1582, 119th Cong.

[33] GENIUS Act, Sec. 7(b), S.1582, 119th Cong.

[34] GENIUS Act, Sec. 13(a), S.1582, 119th Cong.

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