March 27, 2026
Jonathan V. Gould
Comptroller of the Currency
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 7th St., SW
Washington, DC 20219
Via electronic mail: LicensingPublicComments@occ.treas.gov
RE: Public Comment Letter in Opposition to Payo Digital Bank Charter Application (2026-Charter-344995)
Dear Comptroller Gould,
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) opposes the application by Payoneer Global Inc. (Payoneer) for a national trust bank charter under the name Payo Digital Bank, N.A. (Payo Bank).
NCRC is a coalition of more than 700 community-based organizations fighting for a just economy. For nearly 30 years, we have worked to create opportunities for people and communities to build and maintain wealth. NCRC members include community reinvestment organizations, community development corporations, local and state government agencies, faith-based institutions, fair housing and civil rights groups, minority and women-owned business associations, and housing counselors from across the nation.
Payoneer is seeking a national trust bank charter and for the proposed Payo Bank to act as a permitted payment stablecoin issuer (PPSI) under the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act. With a national trust bank charter, Payo Bank would issue, redeem, and manage reserve assets.[1] Payoneer is a financial technology company that operates globally and facilitates cross-border payments for its e-commerce small and medium-sized business customers.[2] According to the Better Business Bureau, it services include “[p]repaid debit cards, global bank transfers, mobile payments, global and local e-wallets, and local currency paper checks.”[3]
NCRC opposes the grant of national trust bank charters to companies engaged in cryptocurrency and stablecoin activities for several reasons, including: (1) doing so stretches the national trust bank charter beyond its statutory purpose and the National Bank Act, and (2) it would encourage regulatory arbitrage, resulting in the loss of community reinvestment, harm to consumers and a lack of oversight and accountability. Granting a national trust bank charter to Payo Bank also will pose risks to the safety and soundness of the financial system, in light of Payoneer’s history of failing to meet legal compliance requirements and would allow Payoneer to provide custodial services, process payments and transmit funds, and manage settlements, without adequate safeguards in place.
1. The OCC does not have authority to issue national trust bank charters to crypto and stablecoin companies such as Payoneer.
The OCC charters national banks under the authority of the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended.[4] Under the Act, the OCC’s grant of trust charters is limited to institutions engaged in fiduciary activities.[5] Specifically, section 92a authorizes the OCC to issue a special permit allowing a national bank to act as a “trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity” in which competing State-chartered institutions are permitted to act under state law.[6]
Payoneer’s application outlines Payo Bank’s intended “fiduciary” management of reserve assets and custodial and safekeeping services related to its own stablecoin, PAYO-USD. A fiduciary is legally bound to manage another person’s money and property for the benefit of the other person, even when contrary to the fiduciary’s interests.[7] By definition, Payo Bank cannot function as a fiduciary for itself. In the absence of its acting in a true fiduciary capacity, Payo Bank’s proposed activities are not consistent with the purposes of the National Bank Act. Thus, the OCC does not have the authority to grant Payoneer a national trust bank charter.
2. If the trust bank charter is granted, Payo Bank would be engaged in core banking activities, such as holding deposit accounts, without corresponding safeguards.
Rather than engage in the traditional responsibilities of a fiduciary, the proposed trust bank would engage in core banking activities by processing payments and “providing custodial services for fiat balances to facilitate stablecoin transactions.”[8] Fiat currency is simply traditional government-issued currency, such as dollars.[9] So, what Payoneer is actually proposing is to hold custodial accounts comprised of US dollars. In other words, it will hold deposit accounts. Yet, in its application, it states it will not apply for federal deposit insurance.[10]
Granting a national trust bank charter here would allow Payo Bank to act as a full-service bank but without the corresponding safeguards, such as deposit insurance or other resolution mechanisms for consumers when traditional banks fail. Thus, consumers storing and using stablecoins issued by a “national trust bank” would not have protections that federally insured depositories offer. With a trust bank charter, Payo Bank would convey the appearance of regulatory legitimacy[11] and safety,[12] which will likely mislead and confuse consumers. This perception gap increases public exposure to monetary loss while allowing Payo Bank to benefit from the reputational privileges of the federal banking system without offering the core protections that actual banks provide. Although trust banks are not FDIC-insured, the “national bank” label could mislead consumers into expecting federal protection and expose them to avoidable harm. Moreover, Payoneer, a nonbank, would continue to control Payo Bank but would not be subject to consolidated Federal Reserve supervision required of bank holding companies.[13]
3. If the charter application is approved, Payo Bank would avoid obligations justifying the privileges granted to full-service banks, creating regulatory arbitrage that harms communities and consumers.
A national trust charter would provide Payo Bank with the reputational benefits, enhanced market credibility, and federal regulatory status of a banking institution while allowing it to avoid many of the fundamental obligations that justify such privileges. This arrangement would create dangerous imbalances in four areas: community investment responsibilities, consumer protection, regulatory oversight and accountability, and systemic risk management. Any form of national bank charter is a privilege, accompanied by obligations to communities and consumers. Approving the application of Payoneer would create a two-tier system where digital asset firms receive comparable federal status without comparable public obligations, undermining the integrity of the entire chartering framework.
3.1. Lost Reinvestment to Communities and the Need for Community Development Obligations
National trust banks are not subject to Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements, meaning granting a national trust bank charter to Payo Bank would grant it the prestige and benefits of a federal charter without any obligation to serve low- and moderate-income communities or meet local credit needs. While traditional banks must demonstrate how they reinvest deposits back into their communities, Payo Bank would face no such requirement, even though it would be holding deposit or deposit-like accounts for consumers. Granting trust bank charters to stablecoin firms will give the patina of legitimacy to cryptocurrency issuers without the same obligations to serve the public.
The CRA requires banks that benefit from federal deposit insurance to meet the credit needs of entire communities, meaning that banks cannot solely serve the wealthiest customers. They must serve the needs of low- and moderate-income households as well. Traditional deposit insurance is a form of public subsidy to the banking industry in exchange for which banks accept obligations to serve the public interest.
Bank deposits fuel community development. A recent report indicated that stablecoins could divert around $500 billion of potential deposits from US banks by the end of 2028.[14] Issuance of a trust charter to Payo Bank would legitimize diverting potentially billions of dollars from community bank deposits into stablecoins held by an entity with no corresponding community reinvestment obligation. This diversion of capital away from entities with a community reinvestment obligation represents a fundamental departure from the principle that federally chartered institutions should serve public purposes, not merely private profit.
The absence of community development requirements for stablecoin issuers means communities will lose billions of dollars of needed community and economic development projects and initiatives. In 2023 alone, banks originated over $126 billion in loans that meet the CRA’s definition of community development for LMI communities and households.[15]
Considering this, stablecoin firms should be required to reinvest a portion of their proceeds into community development projects in underserved communities. Ensuring community development conditions are being met by stablecoin firms would also allow for a more level playing field between banks, especially between community banks, and nonbank or national trust banks. Traditional banks are regularly supervised for their compliance with the CRA. If subject to similar requirements, stablecoin firms could also be held accountable for meeting their community investment obligations through a supervisory process. In the absence of community reinvestment requirements, no stablecoin issuer should receive any form of bank charter. They should not be allowed to avoid CRA requirements, while relying on a supervisory regime that might assure or convey to consumers that stablecoins are a sound way to store funds.
3.2. Threat of Consumer Harm
Payoneer is not accredited by the Better Business Bureau (BBB). In the past three years, the BBB has received 932 consumer complaints against Payoneer.[16] Many consumers complain of frozen funds, abruptly closed accounts without justification or explanation, the inability to access funds, and poor customer service. In addition, some consumers complained of hacked Payoneer accounts and unauthorized transfers of funds.[17] The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s public complaint portal includes complaints related to suspected Payoneer-related fraudulent activities and unexpected fees.[18]
Payoneer’s current business practices have resulted in consumers complaining about the very type of services it proposes to offer as a national trust bank, namely holding funds in accounts, providing access to such funds, and conducting fund transfers. However, numerous consumers complain about Payoneer preventing access to funds, closing accounts, and allowing unauthorized money transfers. There is no reason to think that similar issues will not arise if Payoneer were to enter the cryptocurrency and stablecoin arena as a national trust bank.
As noted in several comment letters submitted by NCRC to the OCC, granting a national trust bank charter to cryptocurrency and stablecoin companies threatens to harm consumers on multiple levels. Fraud, hacking, and cybercrime plague the digital asset ecosystem, with billions of dollars in losses annually. The current regulatory framework governing cryptocurrency and stablecoins fails to prevent massive fraud and financial losses. It does not adequately address stablecoin liquidity standards, reserve requirements, or consumer protection, and these gaps have allowed criminal exploitation to flourish. US consumers are losing billions of dollars a year to fraud, with stablecoins overtaking Bitcoin as the illicit currency of choice for criminals — stablecoins now account for 63% of all illicit crypto transactions.[19]
A recent report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) found routine use of brand-name crypto exchanges by money launderers.[20] The ICIJ-led cross-border investigation with 37 media partners in 35 countries reveals how crypto and stablecoin companies provide the tools that criminals exploit to launder the proceeds of scams, theft, and other crimes — while those who have lost their savings or livelihoods are left with little hope of justice. The findings raise questions about whether exchanges are doing enough to stop illicit flows, either by freezing funds, closing accounts, or carefully monitoring suspicious transactions.
Recent federal and state data underscore the scale of the threat posed by stablecoin and crypto-kiosk fraud. The Federal Trade Commission reported that consumers lost over $65 million to Bitcoin ATM scams in the first half of 2024, with a median individual loss of $10,000, and that older adults were several times more likely to be targeted.[21] FinCEN and multiple state attorneys general have documented that kiosks have been used to launder “millions” in criminal proceeds, prompting a wave of new state laws imposing transaction caps, disclosure mandates, refund rights, and operator registration requirements.
Given Payoneer’s customer complaints are directly related to the type of stablecoin services it intends to offer as a national trust bank and the prevalence of fraud in the cryptocurrency and stablecoin ecosystem, the substantial risk of harm to Payoneer’s customers necessitates the denial of its trust bank application.
3.3. Lost Regulatory Oversight and Accountability: Stablecoin issuers should not be permitted to use a federal trust bank charter to avoid state-level consumer protections.
Traditional banks that maintain community reinvestment programs, robust compliance infrastructure, and comprehensive consumer protections would face a competitive disadvantage against Payo Bank because it would operate under a lighter trust charter while enjoying comparable market credibility. Non-depository fintech companies are subject to state-level registration and regulatory oversight requirements. Granting a national trust bank charter to stablecoin issuers enables regulatory arbitrage that would allow Payoneer to gain federal banking status while both avoiding the obligations and safeguards that justify such privileges and avoiding state-level supervision. The OCC should not permit Payoneer to use a trust charter as a regulatory shortcut to avoid federal and state-level oversight while lacking the responsibilities and protections of insured banking institutions. The resulting competitive distortion could trigger a race to the bottom, incentivizing other institutions to seek similar arrangements.
A federal trust charter for Payoneer likely would preempt its state-level money transmitter licenses and many consumer protection laws that currently apply to its activities in numerous jurisdictions. This federal preemption could weaken consumer protections that states have enacted specifically for digital asset and money transfer activities.
3.4. Risks to Safety and Soundness
Payoneer has a history of engaging in risky behavior. In July 2021, the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced a settlement with Payoneer for over two thousand apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs by processing payments for parties located in the Crimea region of Ukraine, Iran, Sudan, and Syria, as well as processing payments on behalf of sanctioned persons.[22] In its settlement agreement with Payoneer, the New York State Department of Financial Services concluded that Payoneer’s sanctions compliance program was inadequate to properly screen for sanctioned transactions and thus it conducted business in an unsafe and unsound manner, in violation of New York Banking law.[23]
Given this history, it is unclear whether Payoneer will be able to meet regulatory expectations once they are established. Despite the passage of the GENIUS Act, federal regulators have yet to finalize this law’s implementing regulations, which will be critical to establish clear rules for stablecoins, leaving critical issues of backing, redemption, and oversight in regulatory limbo. Even after the GENIUS Act and its implementing regulations all go into effect, which could take several years, legal scholar Art Wilmarth warns that “[b]y placing the federal government’s seal of approval on uninsured and weakly-regulated nonbank stablecoins, the GENIUS Act would greatly increase the likelihood that future runs on stablecoins would trigger systemic financial crises and require costly government bailouts.”[24]
Granting Payoneer a trust bank charter before a comprehensive regulatory framework is in place would expose both consumers and the broader financial system to poorly understood risks. Payoneer’s proposed banking operations would extend the federal safety net to a company whose core business involves highly volatile digital assets. Stablecoin issuers operating through platforms pursue profit-driven business models that are uniquely susceptible to destabilizing runs in the absence of rigorous reserve, redemption, and risk-management standards.[25] Historically, in the United States, bright lines have existed to separate banking from commerce. The separation of banking and commerce is critical to maintaining the safety and soundness of our financial system. The national trust bank charter is a problematic contradiction to that principle.
If Payoneer receives a charter, regulators will have little insight into its corporate parent’s operations even though it and the proposed Payo Bank have many interdependent relationships – compounding the systemic risks that Payoneer and stablecoin operations already pose to the US economy.
Conclusion
In the absence of comprehensive laws and regulations that effectively address safety and soundness, fraud, consumer protection, undue foreign influence, ethical, and regulatory arbitrage issues inherent to the cryptocurrency and stablecoin ecosystem and companies, the NCRC strongly urges the OCC to cease issuing trust bank charters to such companies.
With respect to Payoneer, granting its application for a national trust bank charter would enable regulatory arbitrage, reduce investment into community development, risk significant harm to consumers and communities, and create systemic risk.
We urge the OCC to deny Payoneer’s application.
Thank you for considering this request. If you have any questions about this letter, please contact me at 202-464-2709 or jvantol@ncrc.org or NCRC’s Policy Director Tara Flynn at tflynn@ncrc.og.
Sincerely,
Jesse Van Tol
President and CEO
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)
[1] Application to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to Organize Payo Digital Bank, N.A, (public volume) (Feb. 23, 2026) (hereinafter “Payo Bank Application”), at 2.
[2] Id.
[3] Better Bus. Bureau, Business Profile: Payoneer, Inc., https://www.bbb.org/us/ny/new-york/profile/financial-services/payoneer-inc-0121-91001.
[4] National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
[5] Recent amendment by the OCC to the National Bank Act’s implementing regulation (12 CFR 5.20(i)) does not change the meaning of the statute or the limited nature of the national trust bank charter. The OCC announced the amendments on March 3, 2026. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bulletin 2026-6 (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2026/bulletin-2026-6.html (announcing amendments to 12 CFR 5.20(i)).
[6] 12 U.S.C. § 92a (emphasis added).
[7] See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, What is a Fiduciary?, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-fiduciary-en-1769/.
[8] Payo Bank Application at 3.
[9] Bankrate, What is Fiat Money?, https://www.bankrate.com/investing/what-is-fiat-money/.
[10] Payo Bank Application at 4.
[11] For example, Tether recently announced that its stablecoin, USAT “is now available. . . to operate within the U.S.’s dedicated federal regime” and described it as “a U.S.-regulated dollar-backed stablecoin.” Tether, Tether Announces the Launch of USAT, the Federally Regulated, Dollar‑Backed Stablecoin, (Jan. 27, 2026), https://tether.io/news/tether-announces-the-launch-of-usat-the-federally-regulated-dollar-backed-stablecoin-made-in-america/.
[12] For example, in an interview, the Chief Executive Office of BitGo recently said that customer funds are safer stored with stablecoin companies with bank charters than deposited in traditional banks because they are backed by reserves and traditional banks use deposits to lend. Henri Arslanian, Are Crypto Firms Safer Than Banks?, MSN (Mar. 11, 2026), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/news/are-crypto-firms-safer-than-banks-with bigto-ceo-mike-belshe/vi-AA1Yuf5s.
[13] 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c).
[14] Hannah Long, U.S. Banks May Lose $500 Billion to Stablecoins by 2028, Standard Chartered Warns, Reuters (Jan. 27, 2026), https://www.reuters.com.
[15] Fed. Fin. Inst. Exam Council, Findings from 2023 Data Fact Sheet (Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.ffiec.gov/data/cra/findings-from-2023-data-fact-sheet.
[16] Better Bus. Bureau, Complaints Against Payoneer, Inc., https://www.bbb.org/us/ny/new-york/profile/financial-services/payoneer-inc-0121-91001/complaints.
[17] Id.
[18] Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Complaint Database Search Results for Payoneer, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/?searchText=payoneer.
[19] Chainalysis, 2025 Crypto Crime Report (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-report-introduction/.
[20] Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, About Coin Laundry investigation: Cryptocurrency, (Nov. 17, 2025), https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/about-coin-laundry-investigation-cryptocurrency/.
[21] Fed. Trade Commission, New FTC Data Shows Massive Increase in Losses to Bitcoin ATM Scams,” (Sept. 3, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/09/new-ftc-data-shows-massive-increase-losses-bitcoin-atm-scams.
[22] Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Payoneer Inc., https://ofac.treasury.gov.
[23] N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Consent Order to Payoneer, Inc. (Nov. 2, 2023), https://www.dfs.ny.gov.
[24] Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Congress Must Reject the GENIUS Act and Remove the Dangers Posed by Nonbank Stablecoins, Open Banker (2025), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/AFR-Factsheet.GENIUS-Acts-Flaws-and-Failures.pdf.
[25] Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 2024 Annual Report at 8 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2024). https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2024AnnualReport.pdf.
